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ON KNOWING ONE'S CHAINS AND DECKING
THEM WITH FLOWERS: LIMITS ON
PATIENT AUTONOMY IN "THE
SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR
AND PATIENT"
CHARLES

H. BARON·

In Chapter VI of The Silent World of Doctor and Patient,l Jay
Katz admits to the reader that, despite his very strong belief in patient
autonomy, even he reaches a point where he would feel entItled to
overrule a patient's decision to refuse treatment: "Despite all that I
have said so far, rare situations may arise when patients' choices
should not be honored" (p. 156). As an example, he offers the case of
Mr. D., "a previously healthy 66-year-old black man who had come to
the emergency room [of Dr. Mark Siegler] suffering from an acute feb
rile illness of three days' duration"2 (p. 156). Although Mr. D. con
sented to hospitalization, X-rays, and antibiotics for what appeared to
be a critical illness, he refused two diagnostic procedures-a bronchial
brushing to obtain lung tissue and a bone marrow examination
which were uncomfortable but routine and "medically necessary" for
his proper treatment. When his physicians repeatedly attempted to
. explain the necessity for these procedures, Mr. D. became angry and
began to refuse even routine blood tests and X-rays. A day later, Mr.
D. appeared to be near death. He then refused to be placed on a respi
rator. A psychiatric consultant had interviewed Mr. D. and con
cluded "that Mr. D. understood the severity of his illness ... and that
he was making a rational choice in refusing the tests" (p. 156). Dr.
Siegler himself had conducted two forty-five minute interviews with
the patient and had concluded that Mr. D.
understood the gravity of his situation. For example, when I told
him he was dying, he replied: "Everyone has to die. If I die now, I
• Professor of Law, Boston College Law School; A.B., University of Pennsylvania,
1958; L.L.B., Harvard Law School, 1961; Ph.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1972.
1. J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984) [hereinafter
KATZ).
2. See also Siegler, Critical Illness: The Limits of Autonomy, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Oct. 1977, at 12.
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am ready." When I asked him if he came to the hospital to be
helped, he stated: "I want to be helped. I want you to treat me with
whatever medicine you think I need. I don't want any more tests
and I don't want the breathing machine."
I gradually became convinced that despite the severity of his
illness and his high fever, he was making a conscious, rational deci
sion to selectively refuse a particular kind of treatment (p. 156).
On the basis of these determinations regarding competency, Dr. Sie
gler decided to respect Mr. D.'s objections and allow him to die.
Professor Katz recognizes that Dr. Siegler based this decision
upon a "belief in the rights of individuals to determine their own desti
nies" much like his own. "Yet," he concludes, "I might not have de
ferred to Mr. D.'s wishes, if he had without any explanation persisted
in his refusal to undergo diagnostic tests" (p. 157). "Had Mr. D. been
unwilling to give me his reasons for the refusal, I might have gone
forward with the diagnostic tests" (p. 157). Professor Katz recognizes
as well that some may view his position as surprising in light of the
strong defense of patient autonomy which is the burden of every other
portion of his book. Thus he admits to an obligation to "both define
the conditions in which a physician ought to consider taking such ac
tion and justify such exceptions to the rule of respecting patients'
choices" (p. 157). He immediately goes on to perform the first task in
a simple and direct fashion. However, his effort to deal with the sec
ond not only seems to fail in its narrow goal but reveals problems in
the central thesis of the book.
Under what conditions would he consider disobeying a patient's
choice? Only when the situation meets two conditions: "One, the con
sequences of non-intervention pose grave risks to a patient's immediate
physical condition and, two, the process of thinking about choices is
so seriously impaired that neither physician nor patient seem to know
what one or both wish to convey to the other" (pp. 156-57). Of
course, the first condition sounds very much like the traditional basis
for forcing treatment employed by the physicians whom Professor
Katz criticizes. Thus, his emphasis is on the second condition. "The
first condition ... is only a necessary one for the intervention, it is not
decisive by itself. Interference with patients' choices must also meet
another test: The process of thinking about choices must be seriously
impaired" (p. 158). But what exactly does Professor Katz mean by
such "serious impairment" and why does such impairment justify
overruling patient choices? Without clear answers to these questions
one might be left with the uneasy feeling that Professor Katz has of
fered us psychiatric paternalism as a replacement for medical paternal
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ism. Although physicians could no longer force treatment on patients
on the ground that physical health demands it, they might force such
treatment on patients where mental health demanded it. This might
still represent a net gain for advocates of patient autonomy,3 in that
the new paternalism would justify fewer interventions than the old-at
least in theory. But why should "psychiatric necessity" have any
greater power to override patient objections than "medical necessity?"
I believe that the book does provide a basis for a good answer as
to why impairment of the process of discussion with patients about
their choices might justify intervention by doctors. However,
although this answer is based upon Professor Katz's insights, it differs
in significant respects from any version of a justification which Profes
sor Katz provides in his book. As I will attempt to show, Professor
Katz's arguments fail to the extent that they preserve, in this portion
of the book, medical traditions of pretense to omnipotence which he
eschews at almost every other point in it. The author takes us only
part of the way to enlightenment when he urges doctors to be honest
with themselves and their patients about the uncertainties of medicine
and their own professional limitations. What he misses is the occa
sional need for doctors to be honest about their personal limitations,
their human weaknesses and needs. Professor Katz's arguments for
forced intervention can hope to succeed, I contend, only after they are
translated into terms which draw on this honest recognition of the
humanity of physicians. However, as I will attempt to show, to the
extent that this honest recognition of physician need is shared with
patients, the very act of communicating the need is likely to make
unnecessary the forced intervention which the need communicated
otherwise would be used to justify.
At the beginning of the last paragraph on page 158, after intro
ducing his conditions for intervention, Professor Katz states: "Before
trying to justify why the overruling of patients' choices should be
given serious consideration if these two conditions prevail, I want to
say more about Mr. D." Four pages later, at the beginning of the last
paragraph on page 162, he says: "I appreciate the problem of occa
sional coercion that my prescription raises. While no principle can
rule absolute, including the principle of freedom of choice, exceptions
to it must be most narrowly circumscribed and justified. Let me add
3. For my own position strongly in favor of patient autonomy, see Baron, Licensure
of Health Care Professionals: The Consumer's Case for Abolition, 9 AM. J.L. & MED. 335
(1983); Baron, Medical Paternalism and the Rule of Law: A Reply to Dr. Reiman, 4 AM.
J.L. & MED. 337 (1979).
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to what I have already said about justifications."4 Clearly, we are be
ing told to look in those four intervening pages for important state
ments as to what justifies narrowly circumscribed intervention. But,
as it turns out, what is there will yield only to the reader who is willing
to work hard to find it.
In great part, the four pages are taken up with the discussion of
three cases: Mr. D.'s, a second case involving a fifty-seven year old
woman who would not consent to a hysterectomy because she refused
to believe that she had cancer, and a third involving a fifteen year old
girl who refused high risk heart surgery on the ground that, despite
doctors' assurances to the contrary, she would suffer "intolerable"
post-operative pain. In the two latter cases, doctors ultimately were
able to obtain consent from the patients by eliciting their hidden con
cerns and allaying them. Continued conversation elicited from the
fifty-seven year old woman the fact that prejudice prevented her from
accepting the dire cancer diagnosis from her treating physician be
cause he was black. Discussions with a white doctor and the patient's
daughter led her to drop her objections to surgery. "Without sus
tained conversation her reasons for the initial refusal of a hysterec
tomy might never have been clarified and condemned her to an
unnecessary death" (p. 161). Continued conversation also led the fif
teen year old to opt for her operation and resulted in a happy ending.
Consulted by her physicians, Professor Katz had been moved to sug
gest that a psychiatric social worker talk to the patient in an attempt
to "clarify the confusion between childhood memories and current re
alities" (p. 162).
I was able to throw some light on the mystery of her concern
over pain and suffering. As I listened to her doctors, I recalled
painful memories, reported by patients in psychoanalytic treatment,
about childhood operations. These stories depicted the sudden shift
from happy childhood memories to painful ones about hospitals and
operations, memories of physical discomfort that were augmented
by psychic suffering and confusion over what my patients had per
ceived as a "betrayal" by previously caring parents who, they felt,
had cruelly turned against them. I wondered whether such excruci
atingly painful, unconscious memories might not have influenced
her decision (pp. 161-62).

Again, continuing conversation had done the trick. In the instance of
the fifteen year old, "the availability of a person who could draw on
his professional experiences made the resolution of a puzzling problem
4.

(emphasis added).
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easier. Yet, even if I had not been there, a commitment to conversa
tion might have brought about the same result" (p. 162).
In the case of Mr. D., Professor Katz can only imagine what dif
ference continuing conversation might have made. Perhaps Mr. D.
believed the proposed diagnostic tests to be experimental rather than a
diagnostic necessity. This belief might have been a result of the fact
that he knew himself to be at a teaching hospital. In fact, Dr. Siegler
found out only after Mr. D.'s death that he had, ten years earlier,
signed himself out of a hospital after refusing a bone marrow
examination.
Since in the intervening years he had not been any worse off for his
refusal, he might have wondered whether this test was not equally
unnecessary now. Had he told me about this experience, perhaps I
could have impressed on him that the two situations were not neces
sarily comparable. From there, we could have gone on to talk about
his mistrust of doctors and the uncertainties of medicine. Who
knows what else we might then have explored (pp. 159-60).

It is easy to be swept along by Professor Katz's description of a
world in which everyone gains by the doctor's intervention. In two

cases, a commitment to conversation led to what appeared to be in
formed consent to "medically necessary" procedures. In a third, it
might have led to such consent if it had been pursued. Does Professor
Katz think that that fact .gave him the right to force such conversation
on Mr. D. if he had refused it? Apparently he does. Of Mr. D.'s case
he says:
If on the basis of my nagging and unanswered questions I had inter
vened, I would not have done so because I thought his decision un
wise, foolish or whatever, but because I had no idea whatever why
he had decided what he did. I would have felt confused and been
uncertain whether he was confused as well (p. 160).

And at the conclusion of his discussion of the two other cases he
states: "Both stories, I believe, reinforce the lessons to be learned from
Mr. D.'s case: the obligation to converse so that misconceptions, con
fusion, fears, and ignorance can be clarified; and the necessity not to
accept prematurely patients' refusal to engage in such conversations"
(p. 162). If we leave the justification for intervention at this, then he
has surely replaced medical paternalism with psychiatric paternalism.
Conversing about reasons for refusing treatment is necessary for the
patient's mental health; thus the doctor and patient are obligated to
converse whether or not the patient wants it.
Happily, however, Professor Katz's justification for intervention
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need not be left at this. Other observations which he makes-almost
in passing at times-provide a basis for a slightly altered form of inter
vention; one which might well furnish him with everything he wants in
a fashion more consistent with all of the valuable things in the rest of
this excellent book. At the point on page 162 where he speaks of ad
ding "to what I have already said about justifications," he goes on to
say:
Respect for patients' vulnerability to ill-considered thoughts and ac
tions requires that they engage in conversation. Physicians however.
also have needs that deserve respect. In situations like Mr. D.'s, their
strong ethical commitment to caring for patients can impose intoler
able burdens on them. In these instances, doctors may never know
whether they have explained themselves satisfactorily to their pa
tients. Doctors may then doubt whether they have taken the neces
sary time or made the necessary effort to make themselves
understood. Such doubts can lead to nagging guilt feelings over
having failed in one's professional obligations. Assuaging guilt-in
ducing doubts that may haunt physicians for a lifetime is another
reason for my insistence on conversation (pp. 162-63).5

The theme of the needs of physicians as a basis for justifying their
intervention in patient decisionmaking surfaces at other places in the
book. For example, Professor Katz states in Chapter V that:
[R]espect for the great importance physicians place on beneficence
and loyalty to their patients may suggest that physicians have a
right and need to be informed why their patients do not choose to
follow a proposed course of action so that doctors can be reasonably
certain that their patients have understood their recommendations
(p. 112).

The "needs of physicians" basis for intervention explains much
that would otherwise seem inexplicable in the book. For example, in
his discussion of Mr. D.'s case, Professor Katz asks "What could Mr.
D. have told me that would have led me to bow to his decision?" He
then answers: "It is easy to answer this question at the other end of
the continuum from patients' silence to communication. For example,
if Mr. D. had been a Jehovah's Witness and refused tests on religious
grounds, I would have still talked to him but readily accepted his deci
sion" (p. 160). Why should such grounds be so readily accepted and
others not be? It would seem to be because they "assuage the guilt
inducing doubts" there might otherwise be that the patient is refusing
treatment because the doctor has failed somehow in his or her role.
5.

(emphasis added).
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The patient is refusing treatment for reasons beyond the control of the
doctor-the patient's indoctrination by the church-and not because
"we had not been able to clarify misconceptions, distortions and igno
rance, and that I had not been able to impress on him that he mattered
and was worthy of my time and effort" (p. 160).
But if it is the needs of physicians which, in the end, justify Pro
fessor Katz's intervention in a treatment refusal decision, why does he
not feel that physicians should make that clear to the patient? At one
point, Professor Katz gives us an example of the kind of conversation
he would like to have been able to conduct with Mr. D. in an effort to
have him share his reasons for refusing treatment.
Had I encountered Mr. D., I would have told him that I was puz
zled by his refusal to undergo the proposed diagnostic tests. I
would have expressed to him my concern and confusion over my
lack of understanding of what had led him to his decision, as well as
my concern and fear of perhaps not having adequately conveyed to
him why I thought that these tests were so essential to his well
being.
I would have impressed on him the necessity of our talking
together. Indeed, I would have insisted on our talking together as
long as time permitted in order to clarify our respective positions. I
would have promised him that I had every intention of ultimately
respecting his wishes, but that I could not make an absolute promise
to do so, for it could turn out that the acuteness and seriousness of
his condition might require an intervention prior to our having
made ourselves understood to one another. I would have added
that I expected this to be an unlikely outcome, but that it could
happen. Throughout, I would have tried to convey to Mr. D. that
my insistence on conversation was based on two concepts: to make
sure that I had cleared up any of his misconceptions and confusion
about the need for the diagnostic tests, and that he understood why
I considered the performance of these tests so essential.
If in the midst of our talking together, Mr. D. had "turned
away," and bid me to "leave [him] alone," I would not have left his
bedside. . .. I would have felt impotent and experienced Mr. D. as
all powerful. And I would have recalled what Burt had written in
Taking Care of Strangers 6 that such depictions of myself and him
might have enraged me and made me turn away out of an uncon
scious wish to hurt him. At the same time, I might have overlooked
that the patient too, appearances notwithstanding, was struggling
with feelings of impotence out of "the intense stress [he was suffer
6. R. BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RULE OF LAW IN DOCTOR-PA
TIENT RELATIONS (1979).
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ing] from the incapacitating experience of his illness." Thus, I
would have stayed with him and renewed my invitation to talk with
one another. Had he continued to decline the invitation, I would
eventually have been forced to tell him that I might very well order
the tests, place him on a respirator, and resuscitate him if he refused
to talk with me. "There is too much that we both do not under
stand," I would have added, "and you must not hide behind si
lence" (pp.158-59).

Although there is, at the outset, some mention of the physicians'
fear that they might have failed to convey adequately the facts to their
patients, the discussion quickly becomes impersonal, unemotional, and
deontological in tone. At times Professor Katz makes it appear that
some impersonal force of reason has taken over the relationship. "Ne
cessity" dictates that doctor and patient talk together. The "acuteness
and seriousness of the patients' condition might require" an interven
tion. The physician might be "forced" to order the tests and the use of
a respirator to resuscitate the patient. The patient "must not" hide
behind silence. At other times the physician admits to responsibility
as an active participant in the events, but in a fashion which an
nounces that the physician ultimately controls the relationship. The
doctor "insists" that they talk together and decides whether their con
versation is up to standard. If it is not, the doctor gets to order the
tests. Is this the way that two autonomous human beings are to carry
on a conversation? Where are "Try to see things my way," "Would
you be willing to do this for me?" and "Please!"? To what extent is
the patient made to feel autonomous? In one version of the presenta
tion, the patient is made to feel that both doctor and patient are at the
mercy of the dictates of reason. In the other, the patient is made to
feel ultimately at the mercy of the doctor. Is this more or less likely to
make the patient feel like conversing?
At the conclusion of the section on "Overruling Patients'
Choices," Professor Katz suggests that doctors would rarely be faced
with the necessity for overruling such choices if the medical profession
took seriously the need for "conversation in preparation for choice."
Patients would soon learn from their doctors' example that decision
making in medicine can rarely be carried out in isolation, but only
through mutual interaction. Thomas Aquinas appreciated this when
he spoke of the need for "fraternal correction." Or as Paul Tillich
once put it, "humanity is attained by self-determination and by
other-determination in mutual dependence." Such insights will
eventually make my limited exception to patient choice a relic of the
past. Patients will learn to be less afraid to voice their reasons for
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refusal because they will be confident that such disclosures will only
invite "fraternal correction" through conversation, but no more
than that (p. 163).7
But the sort of doctor-patient conversation which Professor Katz of
fers us does not seem one of "mutual dependence" which risks only
"fraternal correction." It is one in which the patient is made to feel
that the doctor carries the ultimate authority. The doctor has merely
conceded to the patient some portion of the decisionmaking authority
subject to the condition that the patient pass some test by giving the
"right" answers concerning the reasons for refusing treatment. As
with Burt's doctor, why wouldn't such a situation of impotence be
most likely to enrage the patient and cause him or her to tum away
out of a desire to hurt the physician?
To make the needed correction here, we need only take Professor
Katz's principles of doctor-patient conversation a step further.
Throughout his book he has called upon doctors to be more honest
with themselves and their patients about the uncertainties of medicine
and their own professional limitations. Professor Katz has said that:
[P]hysicians must first learn to trust themselves to face up to and
acknowledge the tragic limitations of their own professional knowl
edge; their inability to impart all their insights to all patients; and
their own personal incapacities-at times more pronounced than at
others-to devote themselves fully to their patients' needs. They
must also learn not to be unduly embarrassed by their personal and
professional ignorance and to trust their patients to react appropri
ately to such acknowledgments (pp. 102-03).
What is needed now is to extend these insights to the level of the doc
tors' feelings of neediness and weakness in the doctor- patient relation
ship. Doctors need to acknowledge to themselves and their patients
that it is out of their need and weakness that they are asking the pa
tient to engage in conversation regarding the reasons for refusing
treatment. Although the doctor can, of course, attempt to force a dis
cussion through the threat of coerced treatment, the resulting dialogue
is unlikely to be the kind of true conversation that Professor Katz
would like. Much better-and much more likely to be effective
would be for doctors to make clear that they are asking the patient for
afavor. The doctors should share with the patient that it is the doctors
who are made to feel impotent by the patient's refusal to talk and that
they view the patient as "all-powerful" as a result. Doctors should
7.

(citations omitted).
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make clear that what they need is to be reassured by their patients that
the patient's refusal to accept treatment is not the result of some fail
ing in the doctor's handling of the case and its presentation. Patients
thus realize that they are no longer impotent subjects being put
through some test by those in authority before they can get what they
want. Rather, one human being is asking another human being to do
the first human being a favor. It is a favor which costs the patient very
little. And it is a favor which clearly means a great deal to the doc
tor-someone who has done a great many favors for the patient in the
past and stands ready to do more in the future. Is it likely that any
patient would refuse such a request?
At one point in the book, Professor Katz urges upon his doctor
readers 8 an effort to disabuse their patients of irrational and uncon
scious expectations that the doctor will play the role of parent with
them. At the same time, he cautions them not to expect instant suc
cess in that effort:
Such efforts will not always meet with success and, indeed, can
never be totally successful. However hard one tries to be true to
Rousseau's aphorism that 'It is better to know one's chains than to
deck them with flowers,' some chains that imprison the human
mind inevitably remain decked with flowers (p. 147).

Of course, Professor Katz does not need to be convinced that there is
8. That Professor Katz has so obviously written the book for the doctor-reader raises
a problem which is related to the theme of this essay. It is a further betrayal of vestiges of
paternalism within Professor Katz that he believes that ultimate responsibility for develop
ing meaningful conversation with the patient resides with the doctor. In the book's closing
pages, Professor Katz states: "Both physicians and patients must rethink basic assump
tions about their relationship and about mutual decisionmaking. Physicians here must take
the initiative and lead the way." KATZ, supra note I, at 229. Not surprisingly, this attitude
becomes even more manifest when he sees aspects of his own medical specialty implicated
in the effort. "A greater awareness by both parties of the power of transference and the
obligation ... must be assumed by professionals rather than by their patients. Patients can
only learn of the power of transference over time and through personal experiences with
aware physicians who educate them about its manifestations." KATZ, supra note I, at 144-45
(emphasis supplied). Are patients really so childlike and incompetent that they are incapa
ble of learning for themselves and from each other of the tendency toward and dangers of
the parent/child relationship in medicine? If evidence that they are not were needed, the
experience of the People's Medical Society would seem to be one source for supplying it.
Professor Katz could have written the book for patients, calling upon them to act in a
more adult fashion with their doctors and to pressure their doctors to be more adult and
less parental. Or he could have called upon both doctor and patient to exhibit and request
more adult behavior. The fact that Professor Katz addressed the book to doctors and
recognizes them as ultimately responsible for making informed consent work subtly rein
forces the very dependency of the patient which Professor Katz otherwise seeks to
eliminate.

1987]

LIMITS ON PATIENT AUTONOMY

41

at least as much difficulty in getting doctors to know the chains that
imprison their minds. Doctors are at least as interested in seeing their
patients as needy and grateful children as patients are in seeing their
doctors as caring and omnipotent parents. His book does a brilliant
job of attempting to get the medical community to know those chains
and to rid itself of them by allowing a more adult-adult relationship to
develop between doctor and patient. That the book stops short of tak
ing the relationship to an even higher level along the continuum which
he himself has plotted is no great criticism of what Professor Katz has
done. Indeed, it is a form of criticism which attempts to build upon
what Professor Katz has done and is therefore likely to be welcomed
by him-even if he believes it to be mistaken.
In the introduction to the book, Professor Katz emphasizes that
he views as preliminary the work which has been done on the phenom
enon of informed consent. He observes:
These problems deserve study and their in-depth analysis must be
extended beyond where I leave off. The more I reflect about in
formed consent the more I appreciate how many additional leads
need to be pursued. In this book I have been unable to explore any
to their depth. Instead, I have tried to identify as many issues as
possible and to pursue them for some distance (p. xx).

And at another point, he states: "This book's ultimate purpose is to
initiate a more enlightened debate about the respective rights, duties,
and needs of physicians and patients in their intimate, anxiety produc
ing, and fateful encounters with one another" (p. xxii). Thus the me
dium is the message. Constantly improving conversation among
contributing discussants is what is needed to constantly improve the
conversation between doctor and patient which is the subject of the
discussion. For that effort, Professor Katz provides us with an exem
plary role model-not only by the excellent work which he has done
in helping others to know their chains, but also by the invitation he
issues to have others show him his own.

